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ABSTRACT
There are not enough solid organs available to meet the needs of patients
with organ failure. Thousands of patients every year die on the waiting lists
for transplantation. Yet there is one currently available, underutilized,
potential source of organs. Many patients die in intensive care following
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment whose organs could be used to save
the lives of others. At present the majority of these organs go to waste.
In this paper we consider and evaluate a range of ways to improve the
number and quality of organs available from this group of patients. Changes
to consent arrangements (for example conscription of organs after death)
or changes to organ donation practice could dramatically increase the
numbers of organs available, though they would conﬂict with currently
accepted norms governing transplantation.
We argue that one alternative, Organ Donation Euthanasia, would be a
rational improvement over current practice regarding withdrawal of life
support. It would give individuals the greatest chance of being able to help
others with their organs after death. It would increase patient autonomy. It
would reduce the chance of suffering during the dying process. We argue
that patients should be given the choice of whether and how they would like
to donate their organs in the event of withdrawal of life support in intensive
care.
Continuing current transplantation practice comes at the cost of death
and prolonged organ failure. We should seriously consider all of the
alternatives.
A. INTRODUCTION
Organ transplantation saves a large number of lives and
improves the quality of life of many more. But there is a
major shortfall in the availability of organs. This leads to
potentially preventable death and morbidity in a large
number of people. Yet the resources needed to meet the
demand for organs are potentially available. Every day
there are a large number of patients, who die in controlled
circumstances in hospital, whose organs could potentially
save the lives of others. But the vast majority of these
organs are buried or burned. (See Box 1: The Case of
Ruben Navarro)
The importance of this problem has led in the past to
changes in attitude towards, and the legal status and
clinical care of dying and dead patients. It contributed to
the development and widespread acceptance of brain
death criteria. It has led in recent times to the revival of
donation after cardiac death. It is the main motivation
for proposed changes to consent arrangements for organ
transplantation in countries such as the United Kingdom,
Australia and New Zealand.
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quality of organs for transplantation there are a number
of other options that should be considered. We discuss a
range of alternatives for increasing the supply of organs
from critically ill patients in intensive care from whom it
has been decided that life-support should be withdrawn.
These options range from changes to consent processes,
to the use of pre-mortem extracorporeal membrane oxy-
genation, or organ donation euthanasia. They conﬂict
with ethical norms governing transplantation to varying
degrees. The cost of preserving those norms will be the
death or ongoing morbidity of many individuals. This
may prompt us to consider whether those principles
should be revised or rejected.
B. THE PROBLEM
In the last 50 years, solid organ transplantation has
extended and improved the quality of life of hundreds of
thousands of patients with organ failure. 3000 transplants
take place every year in the UK,
2 while there are close to
30,000 solid organ transplants per year in the United
States.
3 Reﬁnements in surgical procedures, immunosup-
pression and post-operative care for these patients have
increased the beneﬁts that organ recipients gain from
transplants.
4 However, many more patients could beneﬁt
from organ transplants. There is a critical shortfall in the
supply of organs.
5 There are more than 100,000 patients
on the waiting list for a deceased donor organ in the US:
in 2007, 18 patients per day died on waiting lists for
transplants.
6 In the UK, 450 patients per year die because
of a lack of available organs.
7 It is likely that this number
substantially underestimates the problem since a large
number of patients are arbitrarily excluded from waiting
lists.
8 Even larger numbers of patients remain on long-
term dialysis for want of a suitable kidney for transplan-
tation. The demand for organs is also rising,
9 because of
the increasing burden of certain types of organ failure
(for example due to diabetes), and widening eligibility
criteria for transplants.
10
Recognition of the inadequate supply of organs has
prompted a number of countries to contemplate legisla-
tive changes that may impact upon organ donation. For
example, a number of countries have moved to, or are
considering proposals for, opt-out consent systems for
1 C.E. Schneider. Jesting Pilate. Hastings Cent Rep 2008; 38: 14–15; J.
McKinley. 2008. Surgeon Accused of Speeding a Death to Get Organs.
New York Times 27 Feb. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/
02/27/us/27transplant.html [Accessed 28 Jan 2009]; S. Chawkins. 2008.
Transplant Surgeon Acquitted in Case Involving Potential Organ
Donor’s Death. Los Angeles Times 19 Dec. Available at:
http://www.latimes.com/features/health/la-me-transplant19-2008dec19,
0,2830878.story [Accessed 28 Jan 2009] There are a number of ethical
concerns that might be raised about organ donation in this particular
case. There was a failure of the usual separation between the treating
team and the transplant team. It is not clear whether his prognosis
warranted withdrawal of life support. His mother was not present when
he died, and may not have understood the details of the organ donation
that she was agreeing to. These will be discussed brieﬂy in Section F.
2 M. Smith & P. Murphy. A Historic Opportunity to Improve Organ
Donation Rates in the Uk. Br J Anaesth 2008; 100: 735–737.
3 R. Steinbrook. Organ Donation after Cardiac Death. N Engl J Med
2007; 357: 209–213.
4 C.J. Callaghan & J.A. Bradley. Current Status of Renal Transplan-
tation. Methods Mol Biol 2006; 333: 1–28.
5 Smith & Murphy, op. cit. note 2; Steinbrook, op. cit. note 3.
6 United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS). 2009. United Network
for Organ Sharing: Organ donation and transplantation, Richmond, Vir-
ginia available at http://www.unos.org [Accessed 07 Jan 2009].
7 NHS Blood and Transplant. Transplant Activity in the UK 2008–9.
August 2009. Available at http://www.uktransplant.org.uk/ukt/
statistics/transplant_activity_report/transplant_activity_report.jsp
[Accessed 25 Nov 09].
8 Smith & Murphy. op. cit. note 2; S. Bayat et al. Medical and Non-
medical Determinants of Access to Renal Transplant Waiting List in a
French Community-based Network of Care. Nephrol Dial Transplant
2006; 21: 2900–2907. Of note, the UK ﬁgures for deaths on the trans-
plant waiting list are approximately
1/2 those of the United States
(adjusted for population difference). This is not likely to be due to a
higher number of transplants in the UK. In 2008–9 there were approxi-
mately 59 solid organ transplants per million population in the UK,
(NHS Blood and Transplant, op. cit. note 7) while in 2007 there were
approximately 92 solid organ transplants per million population in the
US (2008 OPTN/SRTR Annual Report: transplant data 1998–2007
Available at http://www.ustransplant.org/annual_reports/current/
default.htm [Accessed 02 Dec 09].
9 N.R. Brook, J.R. Waller & M.L. Nicholson. Nonheart-Beating
Kidney Donation: Current Practice and Future Developments. Kidney
Int 2003; 63: 1516–1529; D.K. Cooper. Xenotransplantation – State of
the Art. Front Biosci 1996; 1: 248–265.
10 P. Macdonald. Heart Transplantation: Who Should Be Considered
and When? Intern Med J 2008; 38: 911–917.
Box 1: The Case of Ruben Navarro
1
In late 2006, in a Californian intensive care unit, a
25-year-old man named Ruben Navarro was removed
from life support. He had a progressive neurodegen-
erative disorder, and had suffered an out-of-hospital
cardiac and respiratory arrest. He was believed to
have sustained signiﬁcant hypoxic brain injury, and
the doctors planned to remove him from the breathing
machine and allow him to die. His mother had agreed
to Ruben donating his organs after his death.
A transplant surgeon was present when Ruben was
removed from life support and directed that he be
given doses of sedatives and painkillers. But Mr
Navarro did not die quickly enough to meet the crite-
ria for organ donation. In fact he died some eight
hours after withdrawal of life support machines. The
surgeon involved in the case was subsequently charged
with the abuse of a dependent adult (though he was
later acquitted). Ruben was not able to donate any of
his organs.
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11 It is estimated that such a change
would increase the donation rate by 25–30% in the US or
UK.
12 The same considerations have also given rise to
changes in the source of organs. The potential for organ
donation contributed to the development of brain-death
criteria in the late 1960s,
13 which was central to the devel-
opment of solid organ transplantation. But brain death is
relatively uncommon, and the incidence of brain death is
falling. Even if organ donation took place from all
patients fulﬁlling brain death criteria, there would still be
insufﬁcient organs to meet demand.
14
Other sources of organs have been contemplated,
including xeno-transplantation, stem-cell-derived neo-
organs, living unrelated donors (motivated altruistically,
or through an organ market), and individuals in persis-
tent vegetative state or anencephalic infants (See Box 2).
These options have been discussed elsewhere.
15 Some of
them may provide sufﬁcient organs to meet the demand
in the future, but at present this is not the case.
Yet there is another signiﬁcant potential source of
organs. A large number of patients die in controlled cir-
cumstances in hospitals. In the UK 15000 patients per
year die in intensive care,
16 of whom approximately one
third (5000 patients) die following decisions to withdraw
or withhold life-sustaining treatment (LST).
17 It is widely
accepted that in the face of extremely poor prognosis it is
permissible to withdraw life support and allow such
patients to die. Many of these patients could donate
organs for transplantation. We will refer to this group as
Life Support Withdrawal Donors (LSW donors).
Life Support Withdrawal Donors (LSW Donors):
Patients who are critically ill in intensive care with poor
prognosis from whom it has been decided after discussion
between doctors and family to withdraw life-sustaining
treatment and allow them to die.
We intend this group to include both patients who
currently meet the criteria for brain death and those who
do not. For the purposes of this paper we set aside the
question of whether a whole brain, or higher cortical
deﬁnition of brain death should be used.
A similar (though much larger) group of Life Support
Withholding Donors could be identiﬁed – those who will
die because life support will not be provided. The same
principles could be applied to them, though in practice
the probability of survival when life support is withheld
may be higher than that for patients in intensive care
having life support withdrawn.
18 In this paper we will
11 A. Abadie & S. Gay. The Impact of Presumed Consent Legislation
on Cadaveric Organ Donation: A Cross-Country Study. J Health Econ
2006; 25: 599–620; M. Quigley et al. The Organs Crisis and the Spanish
Model: Theoretical Versus Pragmatic Considerations. J Med Ethics
2008; 34: 223–224.
12 Abadie & Gay. op. cit. note 11; A. Rithalia et al. Impact of Presumed
Consent for Organ Donation on Donation Rates: A Systematic Review.
BMJ 2009; 338: a3162.
13 R.M. Veatch. Donating Hearts after Cardiac Death – Reversing the
Irreversible. N Engl J Med 2008; 359: 672; E.F. Wijdicks. Brain Death
Worldwide: Accepted Fact but No Global Consensus in Diagnostic
Criteria. Neurology 2002; 58: 20–25; M. Potts. 2007. A non-sequitur
(e-letter) J Med Ethics. London, UK. Available at http://jme.bmj.com/
content/33/4/197/reply [Accessed 7 Jan 2009].
14 A. Dorling et al. Clinical Xenotransplantation of Solid Organs.
Lancet 1997; 349: 867–871.
15 For example see R.S. Shapiro. Future Issues in Transplantation
Ethics: Ethical and Legal Controversies in Xenotransplantation, Stem
Cell, and Cloning Research. Transplant Rev (Orlando) 2008; 22: 210–
214; A. Spital. Increasing the Pool of Transplantable Kidneys through
Unrelated Living Donors and Living Donor Paired Exchanges. Semin
Dial 2005; 18: 469–473; L. Pasquerella, S. Smith & R. Ladd. Infants, the
Dead Donor Rule, and Anencephalic Organ Donation: Should the
Rules Be Changed? Med Law 2001; 20: 417–423; R.M. Veatch.
Abandon the Dead Donor Rule or Change the Deﬁnition of Death?
Kennedy Inst Ethics J 2004; 14: 261–276; J. Radcliffe-Richards et al. The
Case for Allowing Kidney Sales. International Forum for Transplant
Ethics. Lancet 1998; 351: 1950–1952.
16 UK Transplant. 2008. Potential Donor Audit (Summary Report
for the 24 month period 1 April 2006 – 31 March 2008). Bristol,
UK. Available at http://www.uktransplant.org.uk/ukt/statistics/
potential_donor_audit/potential_donor_audit.jsp [Accessed 7 Jan 2009]
17 S. Ridley et al. UK Guidance for Non-Heart-Beating Donation. Br J
Anaesth 2005; 95: 592–595.
18 The vast majority of patients from whom life support is withdrawn
die, though the interval between withdrawal and death varies consider-
ably. In practice a very small proportion of patients survive after treat-
ment is withdrawn, often with signiﬁcant impairments and an
abbreviated lifespan. J.P. Lewis, K.M. Ho & S.A. Webb. Outcome of
patients who have therapy withheld or withdrawn in ICU. Anaesth
Intensive Care 2007; 35: 387–392; T. Nolin & R. Andersson. Withdrawal
of Medical Treatment in the ICU. A Cohort Study of 318 Cases During
1994–2000. Acta Anaesthiol Scand 2003; 47: 501–507; A. Esteban et al.
Withdrawing and Withholding Life Support in the Intensive Care Unit:
A Spanish Prospective Multi-Centre Observational Study. Intensive
Care Med 2001; 27: 1744–1749; J.G. O’Callahan et al. Withholding and
Withdrawing of Life Support from Patients with Severe Head Injury.
Crit Care Med 1995; 23: 1567–1575. For example in one Australian
study, 9 (2.3%) of 396 patients who had decisions to limit life support in
intensive care survived to hospital discharge. Of these patients only 2
(0.6%) had prolonged survival – both with severe neurological
Box 2: Sources of organs for transplantation
￿ Non-human sources
 Xenotransplantation
￿ Human sources
 Neo-organs
 Non-vital organs (eg single kidney, part of liver)
￿ Living related donors
￿ Living unrelated donors
 Essential organs
￿ Permanently unconscious patients (PVS,
anencephaly)
￿ Life support withdrawal donors (see below)
 Brain Dead
 Non-brain dead
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patients are presently considered eligible to donate their
organs and actions leading to their deaths are widely
thought to be acceptable. We do not claim that the alter-
natives discussed below are the only way to address the
problem of the organ shortfall. We set aside the question
of whether other sources of organs (Box 2) could provide
equivalent or greater numbers of organs.
A typical setting for a LSW donor would be a patient
like Ruben Navarro who has suffered an out-of-hospital
cardiac arrest, who has been resuscitated and stabilized,
but who has suffered severe hypoxic brain injury. The
patient does not meet criteria for brain death, but
remains ventilator-dependent, and on the basis of clinical
and electrophysiological criteria is felt to be certain to die
or to survive in a vegetative state.
19
It is permissible to withdraw life support from LSW
donors. Their death is inevitable. Yet the decisions we
make about them determine whether their organs will be
buried or burned with them, or whether they will be used
to save the lives of others. The organs from this group of
patients have the potential to alleviate or eliminate the
shortfall in organ supply. We will ﬁrst consider current
practice for organ donation from LSW donors.
C. CURRENT PRACTICE FOR ORGAN
DONATION AFTER WITHDRAWAL OF
LIFE SUPPORT
Currently organ donation is possible from two subgroups
of LSW donors. Patients who are diagnosed as being
brain dead may have their organs removed while residual
body functions are maintained mechanically. Other
patients who are not brain-dead have life support with-
drawn. After their hearts stop, such patients are certiﬁed
as dead and their organs can be retrieved (this is referred
to as Donation after Cardiac Death, DCD).
20 DCD has
been estimated to increase the total number of organ
donors by upwards of 30%.
21
Yet DCD is associated with a number of practical
limitations. While donation after brain death allows
transplantation of both abdominal and thoracic organs,
DCD usually yields only the former.
22 Solid organs
rapidly develop ischemic injury if their blood and oxygen
supply is compromised. So if patients have a prolonged
period of low blood pressure or low oxygen levels prior to
death, or if retrieval of organs is not possible expedi-
tiously after death, there is a signiﬁcant decline in the
suitability of organs for transplantation. Most guidelines
indicate a maximum period between withdrawal of life
support and death, after which patients become ineligible
for DCD. For example, some recommend that the liver
only be retrieved if death ensues within 30 minutes after
withdrawal of LST, while the kidney and pancreas may
be still retrieved if death occurs within 60 minutes.
23
Organs must also be removed very soon after death.
Donors often have LST withdrawn in the operating suite,
with transplant surgeons at hand. This can cause disquiet
or distress to family members who wish to be with the
patient after LST is withdrawn. It also means that family
cannot remain with the patient after death.
24 Some have
suggested that there may be a trade-off between optimal
end-of-life care and organ donation.
25
There have been a number of developments in DCD
that improve the viability and number of organs for
impairments. (Lewis, op. cit. this note.) In another Spanish study none
of 226 patients who had life support withdrawn survived to hospital
discharge. (Esteban, op. cit. this note.) We assume in what follows that
one criterion for a patient being a LSW donor is a very high probability
of death (following treatment withdrawal).
19 E. Zandbergen et al. Systematic Review of Early Prediction of Poor
Outcome in Anoxic Ischaemic Coma. Lancet 1998; 352: 1808–1812.
20 J. Verheijde, M. Rady & J. Mcgregor. Recovery of Transplantable
Organs after Cardiac or Circulatory Death: Transforming the Paradigm
for the Ethics of Organ Donation. Philos Ethics Humanit Med 2007; 2:
8; I. Thomas, S. Caborn & A. Manara. Experiences in the Development
of Non-Heart Beating Organ Donation Scheme in a Regional Neuro-
sciences Intensive Care Unit. Br J Anaesth 2008; 100: 820–826. DCD
has also taken place in patients who have suffered an unexpected
cardiac arrest, and who are unable to be resuscitated. These instances
(sometimes referred to as ‘uncontrolled DCD’) represent a minority of
DCD. There has been some speculation about the use of external
cardiac compressors to convert uncontrolled into controlled DCD. K.
Zeiler et al. The Ethics of Non-Heart-Beating Donation: How New
Technology Can Change the Ethical Landscape. J Med Ethics 2008; 34:
526–529. In this paper we refer exclusively to controlled DCD in LSW
donors.
21 J. Magliocca et al. Extracorporeal Support for Organ Donation after
Cardiac Death Effectively Expands the Donor Pool. J Trauma 2005; 58:
1095–1102.
22 Smith & Murphy, op. cit. note 2. In the UK from 2006-8, brain-dead
donors gave 3.9 organs/donor on average, while DCD donors gave
2.7 organs/donor. (UK Transplant Potential Donor Audit, Personal
Communication)
23 Steinbrook, op. cit. note 3; J.L. Bernat. The Boundaries of Organ
Donation after Circulatory Death. N Engl J Med 2008; 359: 669. It has
been estimated that in 20% of cases, organ donation is cancelled because
death does not follow quickly enough after withdrawal of life support.
(Steinbrook, op. cit. note 3.) This may be an underestimate of the total
number of patients who die following withdrawal of LST who are
ineligible for organ donation because of the length of time it takes for
them to die. There is usually an attempt made before approaching
families to assess whether it is likely that the patient will die within a
given timeframe and some prediction tools have been developed for this
purpose. (Bernat, op. cit. this note.) In another study of patients having
LST withdrawn in intensive care who were potentially eligible for DCD,
only 20% died within 1 hour of treatment withdrawal. J.P. Revelly et al.
Are Terminally Ill Patients Dying in the ICU Suitable for Non-Heart
Beating Organ Donation? Intensive Care Med 2006; 32: 708–712.
24 T. Koogler & A.T. Costarino Jr. The Potential Beneﬁts of the Pedi-
atric Nonheartbeating Organ Donor. Pediatrics 1998; 101: 1049.
25 M.Y. Rady, J.L. Verheijde & J. McGregor. ‘Non-Heart-Beating,’ Or
‘Cardiac Death,’ Organ Donation: Why We Should Care. J Hosp Med
2007; 2: 324–334.
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ing death, increase the chance of organs being suitable.
Infusion of drugs such as heparin prior to death delays
the development of blood clots in organs after circulation
ceases. Arterial and venous catheters can be inserted
while the circulation is still intact, allowing infusion of
cold ﬂuid after death, or making it possible to start heart
bypass machines immediately after death is declared.
26
Reduction in the time-limit for declaring cardiac death
improves the chance that certain organs can be used. For
example, in recently reported cardiac transplants from
DCD donors, surgeons waited only 1.25 minutes after the
heart had stopped before commencing organ retrieval.
27
Following death, donors can be put onto cardio-
pulmonary bypass (extracorporeal membrane oxygen-
ation, ECMO), which restores circulation to organs and
allows unhurried organ retrieval.
28 Alternatively organs
can be rapidly removed and put onto bypass machines
outside the donor’s body (ex-vivo ECMO).
Some of these developments, however, have also
caused ethical concern. Pre-mortem interventions have
been criticized, since they offer no beneﬁt to the patient
(the donor).
29 It has been suggested that they may harm
the donor, for example, by subjecting them to painful
procedures with insufﬁcient analgesia or leading to com-
plications such as limb ischaemia or bleeding, or that they
could potentially hasten death.
30 And post-mortem pro-
cedures that restore the circulation, or transplantation of
the heart, raise questions about the deﬁnition of death.
For example, if circulation is able to be artiﬁcially
restored after death it cannot be said to have irreversibly
ceased and the patient is not by deﬁnition dead.
31 In
addition, brain death normally follows rapidly after the
circulation has stopped. So patients who fulﬁll cardiac
criteria for death usually fulﬁll brain criteria soon after-
wards.
32 But if post-mortem ECMO reinstates circulatory
integrity it may prevent the development of brain death,
creating the unusual situation of a patient who is ‘cardiac
dead’ but not brain dead.
33 It may also lead to the heart
re-starting as it is reperfused with oxygenated blood.
34 To
address these concerns some surgical teams have either
given boluses of lignocaine (thereby preventing the heart
from beating) or devised forms of cardiopulmonary
bypass that only restore circulation to abdominal
organs.
35
These unconventional and investigational procedures
test the boundaries of the determination of death and the
permissibility of organ donation.
36 They highlight the
tension between maximizing the number and quality of
organs for transplantation and the care of patients who
are dying or dead. But if we are to address the shortfall in
organ supply it may be that even more radical changes in
organ transplantation would be necessary. We have to
decide whether it is worthwhile upholding the principles
that currently govern organ transplantation, or whether
the unmet needs of patients with organ failure warrant
their revision or rejection.
We should ﬁrst ask what are the ethical norms relevant
to organ transplantation? Then we will consider alterna-
tive strategies for organ donation from LSW donors and
the ways in which they may conﬂict with these ethical
principles.
D. ETHICAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING
ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION
There is a range of ethical principles that are used to
determine the acceptability of a proposed organ trans-
plant procedure. (Box 3) There is some overlap between
these, and they may come into conﬂict. We do not have
space to provide a normative justiﬁcation for these prin-
ciples, nor to specify the relative importance of different
principles. It is not an exhaustive list, and there may be
others. We merely list here the principles that are most
commonly cited.
37
1. We should maximize the availability and
viability of organs for transplantation
(Principle of maximal utility)
As discussed in section B, there are a large number of
potential beneﬁciaries of organ transplants. Solid organs
from one donor can be used for up to nine recipients.
38
26 M.M. Boucek et al. Pediatric Heart Transplantation after Declara-
tion of Cardiocirculatory Death. N Engl J Med 2008; 359: 709; Maglio-
cca et al., op. cit. note 21.
27 Boucek et al., op. cit. note 26.
28 Magliocca et al., op. cit. note 21; W.J. Ko et al. Extracorporeal
Membrane Oxygenation Support of Donor Abdominal Organs in Non-
Heart-Beating Donors. Clin Transplant 2000; 14: 152–156.
29 Zeiler et al., op. cit. note 20
30 R. Herdman & J.T. Potts. 1997. Non-Heart-Beating Organ Trans-
plantation : Medical and Ethical Issues in Procurement. Washington,
DC: National Academy Press: 57; J.L. Bernat et al. Report of a
National Conference on Donation after Cardiac Death. Am J Trans-
plant 2006; 6: 281–291.
31 Veatch, op. cit. note 13.
32 Bernat, op. cit. note 23; Koogler & Costarino Jr., op. cit. note 24.
33 Bernat, op. cit. note 23.
34 Magliocca et al., op. cit. note 21; C. Dejohn & J. Zwischenberger.
Ethical Implications of Extracorporeal Interval Support for Organ
Retrieval (Eisor). ASAIO Journal 2006; 52: 119–122.
35 Magliocca et al., op. cit. note 21; Ko et al., op. cit. note 28.
36 Bernat. op. cit. note 23.
37 The order of principles here is not meant to convey any lexical
priority of different principles.
38 One heart, two lungs, two kidneys, split liver (one adult, one child
recipient), one pancreas and one intestine.
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affect how many patients will beneﬁt. Other things being
equal we should beneﬁt as many of these individuals as
possible. We can do this by maximizing the number of
donor organs. We should also aim to ensure that those
organs are of the highest quality. If the organs are
damaged, they are more likely to fail after surgery,
leading to the death of the recipient or the need for repeat
transplantation. However, there is a need to balance the
principle of maximal utility against other considerations
including potential harm to donors.
2. We should not do things to potential
organ donors that may harm them
(Non-maleﬁcence)
39
The generally accepted principle of non-maleﬁcence pro-
hibits doctors from deliberately harming their patients.
Certain types of harms are permissible, for example
minor harms with the consent of the patient, or harms
that are necessary in order to secure a greater beneﬁt.
Since the beneﬁt of organ donation is for other individu-
als, it would not usually be acceptable to inﬂict a signiﬁ-
cant harm on the patient in order to facilitate organ
retrieval. Minor harms may be acceptable, if the donor
has consented to them. Where there are alternative
courses of action that involve less harm to organ donors,
other things being equal, those should be taken in
preference.
If killing the patient were felt to be a harm, then this
principle would also justify and overlap with Principle 7
(see below). However, since we are discussing patients
for whom it is permissible to withdraw life-support,
we assume that death is not necessarily a harm for
them.
3. We should respect the autonomous
wishes of patients regarding organ donation
(Patient autonomy)
40
The autonomy of individuals is valued extremely highly.
We generally think it important to respect the wishes of
patients who wish to donate their organs, as well as the
wishes of those who do not wish to donate. Individuals
may have made their wishes explicit before becoming ill
– for example by signing up to organ donor reg-
istries. Some transplant policies may prevent patients
from donating their organs who would like to (or would
have wanted to) donate. Other policies may lead to
organs being removed when the patient would not have
wanted this to occur. Both represent breaches of
autonomy.
41
A related concern is the Kantian rule that prohibits
using people merely as a means to an end.
42 All organ
donation could be susceptible to the criticism that it uses
people as a means. But where people wish for their organs
to be donated, transplantation respects their autonomous
will, and hence does not use them as a mere means.
Indeed, by respecting their autonomous wishes it treats
them as an end in themselves.
4. We should respect the wishes
of the families of organ donors
(Family autonomy)
Ultimately most decisions to donate organs are taken at a
time when patients themselves are not able to express
their wishes. If the patient is not competent, and they
have not made relevant advance directives, the patient’s
family makes decisions about organ donation, reﬂecting
both their beliefs about what the patient would have
wanted (Principle 3), as well as the family’s own prefer-
ences for the terminal care of their loved one. The wishes
of the family may conﬂict with the wishes of the patient,
for example when a family objects to organ donation
despite the patient carrying an organ donor card. The
family’s wishes are usually respected in such cases,
though it is far from clear that this is either ethically or
legally justiﬁed.
39 R. Truog & W. Robinson. Role of Brain Death and the Dead-Donor
Rule in the Ethics of Organ Transplantation. Crit Care Med 2003; 31:
2391–2396.
40 Ibid. Truog refers to this principle as ‘respect for persons’.
41 For organ donation the concept of patient autonomy is somewhat
different from autonomy in other contexts since the patient is (often)
deceased, and the question is whether their previous wishes should be
respected.
42 J.A. Robertson. The Dead Donor Rule. Hastings Cent Rep 1999; 29:
6–14; A. Joffe. The Ethics of Donation and Transplantation: Are Deﬁ-
nitions of Death Being Distorted for Organ Transplantation? Philos
Ethics Humanit Med 2007; 2: 28.
Box 3: Ethical principles that are used to
determine the acceptability of organ
transplantation alternatives
1. Principle of maximal utility
2. Non maleﬁcence
3. Patient autonomy
4. Family autonomy
5. Dead donor rule
6. Brain-dead donor rule
7. Non-killing
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patients prior to death (Dead donor rule)
As deﬁned by some, the dead donor rule explicitly refers
to a prohibition on the killing of patients to obtain their
organs.
43 Here we separate out the two components of
this norm into Principles 5 and 7. With the exception of
donation of non-essential organs from a living patient, it
is not thought to be permissible to remove organs from a
patient prior to their being declared dead. This may be
justiﬁed in terms of harms to the patient (Principle 2) –
the procedure has no beneﬁt to the patient himself or
herself, so it may breach the principle of non-maleﬁcence.
It may also be justiﬁed in terms of the injunction not to
kill patients (Principle 7), since the removal of essential
organs is likely to lead to death. Nevertheless there are
some conceivable situations where removal of a vital
organ would neither harm the patient, nor would it
hasten death (see option 5 below). So we have retained
this as a separate principle here.
6. We should not remove organs from
patients prior to brain death
(Brain-dead donor rule)
Organ donation usually occurs after brain death. As dis-
cussed in the previous section, there are concerns about
the possibility of removing organs from patients who are
‘cardiac dead’ but not brain dead. This might be because
it is actually brain death that provides the crucial norma-
tive justiﬁcation for Principle 5.
44 It could also arise from
a concern that removal of organs prior to brain death
may cause the patient to suffer (Principle 2).
7. We should not deliberately kill patients
(Non-killing)
There is a strong deontological proscription against the
killing of patients. Although there are a few jurisdictions
where euthanasia is permitted, most societies hold that
doctors should not kill their patients. On the other hand
it is almost universally accepted that doctors may with-
draw or withhold LST in patients who are dying or who
have a very poor prognosis. This is not usually classiﬁed
as an act of killing on the basis of the doctrine of double
effect and the difference between acts and omissions.
45
E. POTENTIAL WAYS TO IMPROVE
ORGAN SUPPLY USING LSW DONORS
What alternatives are there to existing policies and pro-
cedures for organ donation from LSW donors? How
would they affect organ quality and supply, and how
would they cohere or conﬂict with the Fundamental Prin-
ciples of transplantation?
There are two main possibilities. Changes to the pro-
cesses for obtaining consent would increase the number
of organ donors without changing any of the procedures
for obtaining organs. Alternatively there a number of
possible changes to organ retrieval that would affect the
number and viability of organs retrieved. (Box 4, Table 1)
Combinations of these are conceivable. As an illustration
of the possible effects of these alternatives, we will draw
43 Robertson, op. cit. note 42.
44 So for example, the British Transplant Society guidelines for DCD
stipulates that sufﬁcient time has elapsed after cardiac arrest for hypoxic
injury to the brain and brain-stem to have occurred. British Transplant
Society. 2005. Guidelines Relating to Solid Organ Transplants from Non-
Heart Beating Donors. London: BTS. After all brain function has been
irreversibly lost we can be conﬁdent that they have no further need for
their organs. By contrast, the inﬂuential US Institute of Medicine paper
on DCD argued that it was irreversibility and not brain damage that
was relevant to the deﬁnition of death on cardiopulmonary criteria.
Herdman & Potts, op. cit. note 30, p59. We acknowledge that there is
substantial overlap between Principles 5 and 6.
45 J.K. Mason & G. T. Laurie. 2005. Mason and McCall Smith’s law and
medical ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 634–635. There are,
however good reasons to think that withdrawal of life-sustaining treat-
ment should be classiﬁed as an act of killing. F.G. Miller, R.D.
Truog & D.W. Brock. Moral Fictions and Medical Ethics. Bioethics
2009; published online 7 Jul 2009. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.
2009.01738.x
Box 4: Options for increasing the number and
quality of organs from LSW donors
Option 1 – Changes to organ consent processes
Option 2 – Organ Donation Euthanasia: Removal of
organs from patient under general anaesthesia.
Death would follow removal of heart.
Option 3 – Cardiac euthanasia followed by organ dona-
tion: Euthanasia by administration of anaesthetic
and cardioplegic agents. Removal of organs after
cessation of circulation.
Option 4 – Neuro-euthanasia followed by organ dona-
tion: Euthanasia by occlusion of blood vessels to the
brain. Removal of organs after brain death certiﬁed.
Option 5 – Organ donation prior to natural death:
Removal of non-vital organs prior to withdrawal of
LST.
Option 6 – Non-brain ante-mortem ECMO: Cardio-
pulmonary bypass to support organs other than the
brain and heart prior to withdrawal of LST.
Option 7 – Reduction in asystolic period prior to cer-
tiﬁcation of cardiac death.
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46
The ﬁgures in Table 2 are approximate, and rely on a
number of assumptions that may be challenged. Never-
theless they may be useful to put into context the possible
beneﬁts of different policies.
Option 1. Changes to consent processes
Currently in the UK 50% of potential heart-beating (HB
ie brain dead) donors, and 13% of potential DCD donors
actually donate their organs.
47 Changes to consent pro-
cesses could improve this proportion (Table 2). The most
dramatic way to increase the conversion rate (the propor-
tion of potential donors who end up donating) would be
a form of organ conscription.
48 Spital and Erin have
argued that organ conscription would have distinct
advantages in terms of efﬁciency, cost, and distributive
justice.
49 This would be more problematic in countries
without universal health care like the US, where there is
already evidence of unfair distribution of organs
46 UK Transplant, op. cit. note 16.
47 UK Potential Donor audit, ibid.
48 A. Spital & C.A. Erin. Conscription of Cadaveric Organs for Trans-
plantation: Let’s at Least Talk About It. Am J Kidney Dis 2002; 39:
611–615; T. Silver. The Case for a Post-Mortem Organ Draft and a
Proposed Model Organ Draft Act. Boston Univ Law Rev 1989; 68:
681–728.
49 Spital & Erin, op. cit. note 48.
Table 1. Organ Donation Options and Principles governing organ transplantation
1. Maximal
Utility
2. Non-
maleﬁcence
3. Patient
Autonomy
4. Family
Autonomy
5. Dead
donor rule
6. Brain-dead
donor rule
7. Non-
killing
Option 1a. Organ conscription
1b. Opt-out consent
1c. Removal of family veto
1d: Increased efÞciency of
seeking consent
Option 2: Organ Donation
Euthanasia
1
Option 3: Cardiac euthanasia
followed by organ donation
1
Option 4: Neuro-euthanasia
followed by organ donation
1
Option 5: Organ donation
prior to natural death
1
Option 6: Non-brain
ante-mortem ECMO
1
Option 7: Reduction in
asystolic period
/-
1
– the number of ticks in column one reﬂect the relative beneﬁt (in terms of number and quality of organs) from each alternative (see Table 2).
– potential conﬂict with principle.
– conﬂict with principle.
Options 1b to 7 are potentially consistent with the autonomy principles, dependent on whether the options in question were known to the donor and agreed to (or would
have been agreed to). See Section F.
1 The actual beneﬁt in number of organs of introducing options 2–7 depends upon the effect of the introduction on overall consent rates. See section F.
Table 2. Estimated potential changes to organ supply in the UK with different options, per year
Options
Number of extra
heart-beating
donors
Number of extra
DCD donors
Total number of
extra organs
Proportion of
current
unmet need
1a. Organ conscription – heart beating only
1 503 0 1962 4.4
1a. organ conscription – both
1 503 463 3212 7.1
1b. Opt-out consent 148 33 666 1.5
1c. Removal of family veto2 13 6 67 0.1
1d: Increased efﬁciency of seeking consent 78 218 893 2.0
Option 2: Organ Donation Euthanasia
3 224–655 -131 520–2201 1.2–4.9
Option 3: Cardiac euthanasia followed by organ donation4 93–524 251–1415 0.6–3.1
Option 4: Neuro-euthanasia followed by organ donation
5 224–655 -131 520–2201 1.2–4.9
Option 5: Organ donation prior to natural death
6 93–524 158–891 0.4–2.0
Option 6: Non-brain ECMO prior to death 93–524 251–1415 0.6–3.1
Option 7: Reduction in asystolic period
7 0 0 189 0.4
(See Appendix for an explanation of how these ﬁgures were derived. Footnotes in the Table refer to the Appendix.)
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50 Organ conscription
might be applied to individuals who are brain dead, or
could be applied also to patients who have died following
withdrawal of LST. Thus it has the potential to increase
the number of organs for transplantation in the UK by
up to 3212 per year. It would violate the principles of
Patient and Family Autonomy (Principles 3 and 4), and
could be criticized for using patients as a mere means.
51
Smaller increments in organ donation could be
achieved in the UK by moving to an opt-out consent
system for organ donation. Some have concerns about
whether this would violate the wishes of patients.
52
However, since this sort of system would allow patients
who have a strong preference not to donate to opt-out of
organ donation, it would appear to respect Patient
Autonomy. Most countries that have adopted a form of
opt-out consent (including Spain, with the highest dona-
tion rates per capita) permit family members to veto
organ donation, even where the patient has not opted out
during life.
53 So Family Autonomy would also be
respected. A change to an opt-out consent system in the
UK would potentially increase the number of transplant-
able organs by 666 per year.
54
In a small number of cases families decline organ dona-
tion even though the patient had indicated during life that
they would like to donate by joining the organ donor
register. If families were unable to veto organ donation in
such cases this would potentially make available 67 addi-
tional organs per year in the UK (Table 2).
55 This would
conﬂict with the Principle of Family Autonomy.
Alternatively, there may be ways to improve the efﬁ-
ciency of organ donation without changing the nature of
consent decisions. Much of the success of the ‘Spanish
model’ of organ donation may be attributed to the pro-
cesses and systems that support organ donation and
counsel families.
56 For example, in the UK potential
donor audit there were 141 patients who were diagnosed
as brain dead in whom organ donation was not consid-
ered, or whose families were never approached.
57 If all
potential HB or DCD donor families were approached
for consent (and the consent rates were the same as they
are at present), 893 additional organs per year could be
made available. This would not violate any of the listed
ethical principles governing organ transplantation, but
would require signiﬁcant resources to be made available
for counselling and support. This would potentially
be sufﬁcient to resolve the current shortfall in organ
supply.
58
Option 2. Organ Donation Euthanasia
Some have argued that we should reject the ‘dead donor
rule’ (Principle 5).
59 This has mainly been embraced to
consider patients who are permanently unconscious, for
example those in a permanent vegetative state, or anen-
cephalic infants.
60 According to some views, their organs
can be removed because they have no prospect of regain-
ing consciousness and continued life cannot beneﬁt
them.
61 In James Rachel’s terms, while their biological life
may continue, their biographical life has ended.
62 They
cannot be harmed by removal of their organs.
63 However,
such a proposal could be more widely cast to include
LSW donors.
It is permissible to withdraw life support from a patient
with extremely poor prognosis, in the knowledge that this
will certainly lead to their death, even if it would be
possible to keep them alive for some time. It is permissible
to remove their organs after they have died. But why
50 A.A. Herring, S. Woolhandler & D.U. Himmelstein. Insurance
Status of US Organ Donors and Transplant Recipients: The Uninsured
Give but Rarely Receive. Int J Health Serv 2008; 38: 641–652.
51 It is arguable whether dead people can be used as a mere means in the
same way as we use live people as a mere means. They are dead, have no
ongoing interests and are incapable of consenting.
52 B. Pierscionek. What Is Presumed When We Presume Consent?
BMC Med Ethics 2008; 9: 8.
53 Quigley et al., op. cit. note 11.
54 The UK organ donation taskforce rejected evidence of possible
increases in donor numbers and recently released a report advising
against the adoption of opt-out consent in the UK. Organ Donation
Taskforce. 2007. The potential impact of an opt out system for organ
donation in the UK: an independent report from the Organ Donation
Taskforce. London, UK. Available at: http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/
Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAnd
Guidance/DH_090312 [Accessed 07 Jan 2009].
55 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging us to
investigate this alternative. Combinations of these measures are pos-
sible. For example an opt-out organ donation consent system could be
introduced without permitting family members to veto donation. This is
sometimes referred to as a ‘hard opt-out’ form of organ donation
(ibid:12). It is not possible from UK ﬁgures to estimate what effect this
would have on overall organ supply.
56 Quigley et al., op. cit. note 11.
57 UK Transplant audit, op. cit. note 16.
58 This depends whether the organs made available were of the right
sort and tissue type to meet the needs of those currently dying while
waiting for a transplant. It may not be enough to provide organs for
those patients who at present are arbitrarily excluded from waiting lists
(see note 8).
59 Truog & Robinson, op. cit. note 39; C. Coons & N. Levin. The Dead
Donor Rule, Voluntary Active Euthanasia and Capital Punishment.
Bioethics 2009. Published online 26 Oct 2009. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-
8519.2009.01767.x
60 Veatch, op. cit. note 15.
61 P. Singer. 1994. Rethinking Life and Death. Melbourne: The Text
Publishing Company: 207. In two surveys in the US, a majority of
respondents supported donation of organs from patients in permanent
coma or vegetative state. J.M. DuBois & T. Schmidt. Does the Public
Support Organ Donation Using Higher Brain-Death Criteria? J Clin
Ethics 2003; 14: 26–36; L.A. Siminoff, C. Burant & S.J. Youngner.
Death and Organ Procurement: Public Beliefs and Attitudes. Soc Sci
Med 2004; 59: 2325–2334.
62 J. Rachels. 1986. The End of Life : Euthanasia and Morality. Oxford:
Oxford University Press: 24–25.
63 Truog & Robinson, op. cit. note 39.
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© 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.should surgeons have to wait until the patient has died as
a result of withdrawal of advanced life support or even
simple life prolonging medical treatment? An alternative
would be to anaesthetize the patient and remove organs,
including the heart and lungs. Brain death would follow
removal of the heart (call this Organ Donation Euthanasia
(ODE)). The process of death would be less likely to be
associated with suffering for the patient than death fol-
lowing withdrawal of LST (which is not usually accom-
panied by full anaesthetic doses of drugs). If there were a
careful and appropriate process for selection, no patient
would die who would not otherwise have died.
64 Organs
would be more likely to be viable, since they would not
have sustained a period of reduced circulation prior to
retrieval. More organs would be available (for example
the heart and lungs, which are currently rarely available
in the setting of DCD). Patients and families could be
reassured that their organs would be able to help other
individuals as long as there were recipients available, and
there were no contraindications to transplantation. This
is not the case at present with DCD, since many patients
do not die sufﬁciently quickly following withdrawal of
LST for organ retrieval.
This proposal has been mooted before.
65 For example,
Robert Truog has argued that those who are imminently
dying or permanently unconscious should be permitted to
donate their organs in a manner similar to that described
above.
66
ODE would not be likely to cause the patient suffering,
however, it would conﬂict with Principles 5, 6 (the dead
donor rules) and 7 (non-killing).
Technically, this would be a form of killing – active
euthanasia. It would conﬂict with the doctrine of double
effect. Yet the justiﬁcation for ODE is wider than that for
organ donation from permanently unconscious or brain
dead patients. The broader justiﬁcation for ODE includes
not merely those who no longer have interests, but those
who will inevitably shortly die. The argument for remov-
ing organs from this group is even stronger. It does not
rely on controversial judgements of quality of life, well-
being or interests. These patients will die because they are
on life sustaining treatment and it will be withdrawn.
Indeed we would suggest that, although most arguments
for euthanasia are distinguished from questions of organ
donation, it may be that the beneﬁts of donation, for the
individual and for others, provide the strongest case for
euthanasia.
One of the most basic principles of rationality and
economics is that if one state of affairs is a Pareto
improvement, we have strong reason to prefer it.
67 A
change is a Pareto improvement if it leads to at least one
individual being better off, while no individual is worse
off.
68 States of affairs in which some individuals are better
off while others are worse off are not Pareto improve-
ments. Similarly, changes that involve beneﬁts in some
respects, but costs in other respects would not be Pareto
superior.
ODE for LSW donors can be regarded as a Pareto
improvement to the current practice of withdrawal of
life-sustaining treatment and donation after cardiac
death. In all cases the patient dies, but in the case of ODE
more lives are able to be saved by harvesting functioning
organs, and the desire of the patient that their organs be
used to help others is more likely to be able to be
respected.
ODE might not be regarded as a Pareto improvement
if the killing of the patient were regarded as a moral harm
or a rights violation.
69 However, it is difﬁcult to see why a
patient is morally harmed or has their rights violated if
they are actively killed, compared with a state of affairs
where they die as a result of treatment withdrawal,
assuming that they have consented to either. Note that
while ODE in the case of withdrawal of LSW donors is a
Pareto improvement, the same might not be said for
removing organs from patients who are permanently
unconscious, unless treatment would otherwise be with-
drawn. Such patients may survive for some time, and
have a ﬁnite (albeit small) chance of spontaneous or
treatment-induced improvement in consciousness.
70
It is difﬁcult to estimate the effect of introducing ODE
on overall organ donation rates. It could be up to an
additional 2201 organs per year in the UK: crucially,
however, it would depend upon the consent rates for
organ donation and how they are affected by the intro-
duction of this alternative. (See Section F for further
64 Ibid. See also Section F.
65 See for example ibid; R.M. Arnold & S.J. Youngner. The Dead
Donor Rule: Should We Stretch It, Bend It, or Abandon It? Kennedy
Inst Ethics J 1993; 3: 263–278. N. Fost. Review: The New Body Snatch-
ers: On Scott’s ‘The Body as Property’. Am Bar Found Res J 1983; 8:
718–732.
66 Truog’s justiﬁcation for ODE is different from that presented here.
He argues that current concepts of brain death and the dead-donor rule
are incoherent, and he proposes an alternative based upon the principles
of autonomy and non-maleﬁcence. We ﬁnd Truog’s arguments compel-
ling. Our paper can be seen as providing a complementary argument in
favour of ODE.
Truog favours a narrow deﬁnition for the group of patients who may
consent to this procedure: only those who will die within minutes of
withdrawal of life support, or who are permanently unconscious. Our
deﬁnition of LSW donors overlaps with Truog’s, but includes the larger
group of patients from whom it is permissible to withdraw life support
in intensive care, and whose death is highly likely to ensue (though not
necessarily instantly).
67 A. Buchanan. 1985. Ethics, EfÞciency and the Market . Oxford: Clar-
endon Press: 12.
68 Ibid; P. Shaw. The Pareto Argument and Inequality. Philos Q 1999;
49: 353–368.
69 Ibid.
70 D.J. Wilkinson et al. Functional Neuroimaging and Withdrawal of
Life-Sustaining Treatment from Vegetative Patients. J Med Ethics 2009;
35: 508–511.
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viduals with the greatest possible chance of donating their
organs to others. For each patient who would not other-
wise be able to donate (because death would be too
prolonged following withdrawal of LST), up to nine
additional individuals would be able to receive organs.
Option 3. Cardiac euthanasia prior to
organ donation
If we believe that we should not remove organs from
patients who are still alive, even where they have con-
sented to this and would otherwise die anyway, then one
alternative would be to euthanize the donor and retrieve
organs after cardiac death had been declared. This would
already be a theoretical option in countries where eutha-
nasia is permitted. Organ donation after cardiac eutha-
nasia has been described in a patient in Belgium.
71 Organ
donors could be given large doses of sedative, and car-
dioplegic agents (to stop the heart). Again, this would
reduce the risk of patients suffering after withdrawal of
LST and make organ donation possible for some patients
who would otherwise not be able to donate. In an
extreme case, they might choose to undergo euthanasia at
least partly to ensure that their organs could be donated.
However, the agent used to stop the heart, and the period
of loss of circulation that ensued, might compromise
organ viability in the same way as DCD does at present.
The magnitude of the beneﬁt is hard to quantify but it is
likely to be less than ODE.
72
Option 4. Neuro-euthanasia prior to
organ donation
Since patients who donate organs after Cardiac Eutha-
nasia (Option 3) may be able to donate fewer organs (and
have more compromised organs) than HB donors, one
option would to perform euthanasia in such a way as to
induce brain death (we could call this Neuro-euthanasia).
After sedation and local anaesthesia, catheters could be
inserted into blood vessels in the groin of the patient.
These could then be advanced to the blood vessels sup-
plying the brain. Catheter occlusion of both internal
carotid arteries and vertebral arteries would lead to brain
death, while life support would continue to be provided
to maintain the circulation to other organs. After brain
death was conﬁrmed, organs could be retrieved. There
may be concerns about possible discomfort to the patient
caused by the neuro-euthanasia procedure; but this could
be mitigated by giving the patient a general anaesthetic
before the procedure.
But Neuro-euthanasia may affect the viability of
organs for transplantation. There are variable criteria for
diagnosing brain death across the world.
73 Many coun-
tries require a period of observation to conﬁrm the diag-
nosis of brain death, which can lead to some delay prior
to organ retrieval. Maintenance of circulation and organ
viability is not always easy after brain death, and the
process of brain death itself may compromise subsequent
organ function.
74 The number and quality of organs
potentially available following this procedure would be
higher than after Cardiac Euthanasia but less than ODE.
Obviously both Options 3 and 4 would violate the
injunction against physician killing (Principle 7) even if
they do not violate the dead donor rules (Principles 5 and
6). It is hard to believe, however, that if it is permissible to
euthanize a patient who would otherwise die following
withdrawal of life support, that Neuro-euthanasia prior
to organ donation would be preferable to ODE.
Option 5. Organ donation prior to
natural death
Are there options that do not involve physician killing? It
is permissible for living patients to donate non-essential
organs. For patients who are dying, or who will die
rapidly of cardio-respiratory failure following with-
drawal of LST, certain organs are no longer essential.
Patients could be anaesthetized and solid organs
removed, for example kidney, liver, and pancreas.
Removal of these organs would probably not hasten
death.
75 After donation of organs, mechanical ventilation
and medications to support the circulation could be with-
drawn, and the patient allowed to progress to circulatory
death. Other organs may be able to be retrieved after
cardiac death was established.
This option would conﬂict with Principles 5 and 6, the
dead donor rules. But since it is permissible to donate
non-essential organs (for example in living related or
altruistic kidney donation) these rules do not necessarily
preclude donation.
If organ donation occurs under anaesthesia it would be
unlikely to cause the patient to suffer immediately.
However, since patients are sedated but not usually fully
anaesthetized at the time when LST is withdrawn, it is
71 O. Detry et al. Organ Donation after Physician-Assisted Death.
Transpl Int 2008; 21: 915.
72 In the Belgian case 10 minutes elapsed after the circulation ceased
before organ retrieval commenced. Only the liver and kidneys were
transplanted. (Ibid.)
73 Wijdicks op. cit. note 13.
74 Magliocca et al., op. cit. note 21.
75 Absent kidney, liver or pancreatic function can lead to death – but
not usually in a short time frame (days or weeks rather than hours).
Thus if death were predicted within this time frame, organ donation
prior to treatment withdrawal would be unlikely to affect the timing of
death.
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donor would experience pain that they would not other-
wise have experienced.
76 In addition there are some
patients, dependent upon life-support, who survive for a
longer period of time after LST is withdrawn. Such
patients could experience negative consequences of
having organs removed, and their death may be hastened.
Pancreas and kidney function could be provided artiﬁ-
cially, however, liver function is not able to be readily
replaced. This might mean that only kidney and/or pan-
creas transplants would be permitted prior to natural
death.
The numbers of additional organs that would be avail-
able from this policy are likely to be signiﬁcantly less than
with Options 2–4. (Table 2)
Option 6. Non-brain ECMO prior to
natural death
Heart-lung bypass (ECMO) has already been used after
death to improve the perfusion of organs until they can
be retrieved.
77 It is felt to be acceptable to insert tubes into
blood vessels prior to death in DCD donors to reduce
delays in initiating bypass.
78 One option would be to
provide a form of organ support prior to death. The
bypass machine would support the circulation of all
organs except the heart, lungs and brain. Life support
(except the ECMO machine) would be withdrawn, and
the patient’s heart allowed to stop naturally. Once the
patient was declared dead, the organs could be removed.
The advantage of this procedure would be that organs
could be retrieved even if it took some hours for the
patient’s heart to stop. There would be no unseemly rush
after life support was removed, and family could spend
time with the patient after death, before organ removal.
Non-brain ECMO would not change the status of the
patient, since cardiac death would lead to brain death.
Non-brain ECMO would not cause the patient’s death
(so it would not necessarily violate Principles 5–7).
It should be noted that although non-brain ECMO
would be technically possible, it would be difﬁcult to be
sure that it would not alter the progression to cardiac
death after withdrawal of LST. ECMO is an expensive
and invasive intervention, and could potentially harm the
patient (Principle 2). It would potentially lead to similar
numbers of organs to Option 3 (Cardiac euthanasia prior
to organ donation). Thoracic organs would not be able to
be retrieved.
Option 7. Organ donation following
brief asystole
Currently most DCD organ donation procedures com-
mence 5–10 minutes after the heart has stopped (asys-
tole). Some centres commence organ donation earlier,
after 2
79 or even 1.25 minutes of asystole
80 since this may
improve the viability of organs. However, this interval
could be shortened further, for example to 20 seconds
before declaration of death.
81
Current deﬁnitions of cardiac death are based upon
the idea of irreversible cessation of circulation.
Although the circulation could be restarted with initia-
tion of resuscitation measures after periods of even 10
minutes of asystole, it has been argued that in the
context of withdrawal of LST it would not be appropri-
ate (or ethical) to attempt to do so.
82 A decision has
been made to discontinue life support and whatever
reasons have justiﬁed that decision they would apply
equally to not resuscitating. But ‘irreversibility’ is then
contingent upon a decision not to attempt resuscita-
tion.
83 Such a deﬁnition of irreversibility might also
apply to shorter periods of asystole. But the heart may
sometimes start again by itself (so-called autoresuscita-
tion) after brief periods of asystole. So this option may
hasten death in patients where the heart would have
autoresuscitated had not organ retrieval commenced
(thus contravening Principle 7).
84 It would also poten-
tially violate Principle 6 (Brain-dead donor rule) since
there would not have been sufﬁcient time after cessation
of circulation for brain death to occur.
Option 7 would not lead to any more donors than
available at present, though it would increase the viabil-
ity of organs from DCD donors, and potentially
make donation of heart and lungs from such patients
possible.
76 It may be possible to reduce the chance of this – for example with the
use of epidural anaesthesia.
77 Magliocca et al., op. cit. note 21.
78 Dejohn & Zwischenberger, op. cit. note 34.
79 M.A. DeVita & J.V. Snyder. Development of the University of Pitts-
burgh Medical Center Policy for the Care of Terminally Ill Patients
Who May Become Organ Donors after Death Following the Removal
of Life Support. Kennedy Inst Ethics J 1993; 3: 131–143.
80 Boucek et al., op. cit. note 26.
81 If the interval were shortened to less than one minute it would not be
possible to distinguish extreme bradycardia from periods of asystole.
82 S. Shemie. Clarifying the Paradigm for the Ethics of Donation and
Transplantation: Was ‘Dead’ Really So Clear before Organ Donation?
Philos Ethics Humanit Med 2007; 2: 18.
83 S. Ozark & M.A. Devita. Non-Heartbeating Organ Donation:
Ethical Controversies and Medical Considerations. Int Anesthesiol Clin
2001; 39: 103–116.
84 Although organ donation after brief asystole might lead to death
sooner than would otherwise occur, it would not be likely to lead to
death in patients who would have survived had organ donation not taken
place. (see note 18) Even if the heart restarts in this setting, without
further resuscitation the death of the patient is likely to follow within a
fairly short interval.
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DONATION OPTIONS
The aforementioned alternatives for increasing organ
availability may seem disturbing or even shocking. As
highlighted, they conﬂict to some degree with one or
more of the fundamental principles governing organ
transplantation and the care of dying patients.
85 Yet
many of the currently accepted transplantation practices
(donation after brain death, or donation after cardiac
death) would have been shocking to the societies of only
a few decades ago. The needs of patients who are suffer-
ing and dying for want of available organs have pre-
viously led us to revise our principles governing
transplantation. Perhaps they should again. What spe-
ciﬁc objections might be raised to them?
1. Consent
One objection to most of the above alternative organ
donation procedures is that the prior consent of donors
may not apply. It is not likely, for example, that current
potential donors had imagined that they might be placed
on heart bypass machines before their death in order to
maintain their organs. A similar criticism has been lev-
elled at DCD as currently practised,
86 and may have
applied in the case of Ruben Navarro, referred to at the
start of this paper.
It might not apply to all patients however, and this
criticism would not necessarily apply to future donors.
If a society adopted Option 2 for example, it may then
come to be widely understood that those who consent to
organ donation and who are dying in intensive care
would have their organs removed in a surgical proce-
dure that would lead to death. The important question
for Options 2 to 7 is whether such procedures should be
allowed – if consent is given. Furthermore it would be
possible to give donors a range of options of organ
donation, and the freedom to choose the method that is
most consistent with their own values. This would fully
respect the autonomy of donors and may increase the
acceptability of changes to organ donation practice (see
below).
One of the alternatives outlined above is to reject the
need for consent for organ donation and to conscript
organs (Option 1a). This would require a paradigm shift
in approach to organ donation, but as is apparent from
Table 2, it is the alternative likely to lead to the greatest
increase in the number of available organs. The main
reason not to have an organ draft would be that it would
violate the autonomy of patients and families who do not
wish to donate. We need to weigh this against the sub-
stantial burden of death and illness that organ conscrip-
tion could prevent. At times of great community need
(for example during war) conscription of the living for
military service has been the norm, and continues to be in
some parts of the world. (Organ Conscription would
seem a far preferable alternative to military conscription
since it would involve no individuals dying or suffering
for the sake of others.) But the greatest hurdle to any such
change may be community acceptance.
2. Community Acceptance?
There is signiﬁcant public concern about elements of
current transplantation practice. So it may be argued that
any of the alternatives discussed in this paper (particu-
larly the more radical ones) would be extremely unlikely
to meet with general community acceptance (and hence
would not be politically achievable). A related concern is
that this may threaten acceptance of transplantation
more generally.
87
In the absence of conscription, organ donation is
dependent upon the implicit or explicit consent of poten-
tial donors. Organ donation options outlined above may
alienate or disenchant potential donors. They could para-
doxically lead to an overall reduction in available organs
due to fewer people signing on to organ donor registries,
and fewer families consenting for donation.
If it were the case that changes to organ donation
procedures led to a fall in consent rates, this would under-
mine the principal reason that we have given to change
donation procedures. However, whether or not this even-
tuates would depend upon how such a change were insti-
tuted, how the consent of patients were sought, and how
well public concerns about such a change were able to be
allayed. It is not necessarily the case that changes to
organ donation would lead to a loss of community con-
ﬁdence. For example, one option mentioned in the pre-
ceding section would be to allow patients speciﬁcally to
opt in to the novel procedure or to a range of novel
procedures of their choice.
88 Potential donors could
indicate which of several organ donation procedures they
consented to (e.g. brain-death donation, DCD, ODE) at
the time of signing on to an organ donation registry, or
when making advance directives. This sort of speciﬁc
85 Except option 1c – increased efﬁciency of obtaining consent.
86 Verheijde, Rady & Mcgregor, op. cit. note 20.
87 Indeed, some may have concerns that even the discussion of such
options may negatively impact on organ donation rates.
88 In a similar vein some some have supported the idea that individuals
should be permitted to opt-in to alternative criteria for death. K. Zeiler.
Deadly pluralism? Why death concept, death deﬁnition, death criterion
and death test pluralism should be allowed, even though it creates some
problems. Bioethics 2009; 23: 450–459. A. Bagheri. Individual Choice in
the Deﬁnition of Death. J Med Ethics 2007; 33: 146–149. Veatch.
Abandon the Dead Donor Rule or Change the Deﬁnition of Death?
op. cit. note 15.
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organ donation, as well as to helping to allay community
fears.
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It should be noted though, that this may reduce the
effectiveness of the change in terms of increasing the
numbers of available organs. It is likely that at least
initially the numbers of individuals who would opt-in to
ODE (for example) would be small. It would mean that
the overall impact of introducing ODE would be much
less than the estimates in Table 2. It would undermine the
case in terms of organ supply for this alternative. It could,
however, be used as proof in principle of the procedure as
a way of ethically increasing the supply of organs.
Two other important community fears that would need
to be addressed in any change in organ donation policy
include patient selection for donation, and harm associ-
ated with the procedures.
3. Patient selection for organ donation
One concern sometimes expressed about changes to
organ donation procedures is that this may lead to the
death of patients who would have otherwise survived. If
doctors know that a patient’s organs can be used to save
others’ lives, it may inﬂuence their assessment of whether
a patient’s condition is truly hopeless. Of course, this
concern might apply equally to current practice of DCD
as for Options 5 to 7. It could be thought to apply in the
case of Ruben Navarro, for example. It would potentially
be a greater concern for Options 2–4, since they would
involve actions leading to the patient’s death.
Yet it is possible to prevent this from happening.
Current practice for diagnosis of brain death, or for deci-
sions about withdrawal of LST, is that these processes are
temporally and logistically separated from considerations
of eligibility and consent for transplantation. The ques-
tion of whether or not a patient would have wanted to
donate her organs, and whether the family would agree to
this, is only raised after a decision has already been made
to withdraw life support. People not involved in the clini-
cal care of the patient (for example regional transplant
coordinators) usually initiate such discussions. And
intensive care staff rather than the transplant team
provide the care of the patient after withdrawal of LST.
90
This may not be sufﬁcient to prevent some contamination
of decisions about withdrawal of life support – for
example if doctors happen to know that a patient is an
organ donor. It may be a greater concern if organs are
conscripted, since doctors will know with certainty that if
brain death is diagnosed, or if a decision is made to
withdraw LST, organs will be available to be retrieved.
One additional measure that could prevent abuse and
allay concern would be to set up an independent body
responsible for conﬁrming brain death or extremely poor
prognosis. This group’s sole function would be to
perform neurological tests and to review prognostic
information. They would be called in, as regional trans-
plant teams are currently called in, when a patient was felt
by doctors to be a potential organ donor. But they would
have no role in transplants, and would be responsible
for ensuring that patients with a signiﬁcant chance of
meaningful recovery were not euthanized or allowed to
die.
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If there were careful selection, including independent
scrutiny of decisions, changes to transplantation pro-
cesses would not necessarily lead to any patients dying
who would otherwise have lived. Indeed, such a process
may promote more ethical withdrawal of treatment.
4. Harm from organ donation
The other fear related to organ donation that would need
to be addressed if the community were going to embrace
a change in practice, is that of harm or suffering from
organ donation. It is one thing for someone to agree to
donate their organs after death. At that point, they
cannot be harmed by what happens to their body.
However, if transplantation practice is changed to
include procedures that can take place before death,
patients may have some reason to worry about whether
they will suffer as a consequence. One fear that people
sometimes express about organ donation is of being con-
scious of having one’s organs removed.
92
If Option 2 (Organ Donation Euthanasia) were
adopted, then people might have more reason than at
present to harbour this fear. However organ donation
would occur under general anaesthesia. There would be
no more reason to fear being conscious during this pro-
cedure than there is to fear being conscious during any
surgical procedure, including the widely accepted practice
of live kidney donation. In fact there is some reason to
think that options 2–4 would be less likely to cause
patients to suffer than current procedures for withdrawal
of life support and organ donation. On the other hand,
Options 5 to 7 could be associated with conscious
89 Indeed, many current donors might not be aware of all available
means of organ donation (for example DCD). Our proposal would
increase autonomy by providing patients with a range of options and
allowing them to choose those they wished to apply to themselves.
90 In the case of Ruben Navarro there was a break-down in this normal
separation.
91 A requirement for independent conﬁrmation of prognosis for LSW
donors would potentially delay treatment withdrawal. But at present
treatment withdrawal is sometimes delayed to allow transplant teams to
prepare. There would be a strong incentive to ensure that conﬁrmation
of prognosis was able to occur expeditiously. If this were not able to
take place within a reasonable time frame life support might still be able
to be withdrawn, but organ donation could not proceed.
92 J. Bourke. 2006. Fear : A Cultural History. London: Virago: 317.
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against them, or would mandate their modiﬁcation to
avoid this possibility.
5. Preferable alternatives
Some may argue that even if it would be, in theory,
possible to gain community acceptance of an alternative
such as ODE, other alternatives should be pursued ﬁrst.
For example, improved efﬁciency of obtaining consent,
or the adoption of higher brain criteria for brain death
may be politically easier to achieve.
93 As noted at the start
of this paper, we do not claim that the alternatives dis-
cussed here are the only ways to address the organ short-
fall. However, given the ongoing preventable death of
large numbers of patients with organ failure, we believe
that it is important to consider seriously all the alterna-
tives. Unless, and until these other options alleviate the
demand for organs, there is good reason to permit ODE.
6. Broader implications
Finally, it may be objected that the arguments advanced
above in support of novel organ donation alternatives
would support a much broader policy of allowing
patients to choose Organ Donation Euthanasia, for
example if they were terminally ill or rationally suicidal.
However, although Options 2–4 would conﬂict with
the doctrine of double effect and Principle 7 (Non-
killing), it does not follow from the arguments in this
paper that other instances of intentional ending of life
would be necessarily permissible. ODE, as we have
described it, is supported by a basic principle of rational-
ity. It would be a Pareto improvement in that only
patients who would have died anyway donate their
organs. In contrast, the introduction of a policy of vol-
untary active euthanasia would not be a Pareto improve-
ment, since it would involve the death of patients who
would otherwise have lived.
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The arguments developed above may lead some to
reject the doctrine of double effect, and consider allowing
voluntary active euthanasia. But we have suggested
that there are particularly strong reasons for allowing
individuals to choose how their life ends if they are depen-
dent on life support and life-sustaining treatment is going
to be withdrawn. Those who do not wish to support
voluntary active euthanasia in other circumstances
should consider whether an exception to the doctrine of
double effect and the Principle of Non-Killing is justiﬁed
in this situation.
At the start of this paper we referred to the case of
Ruben Navarro. It might be thought that his case high-
lights the dangers of expanding organ donation pro-
cesses. Some of the above concerns (including in
particular those of consent and patient selection) were
expressed in media commentary on the case.
95 On the
contrary, we believe that providing more options to
patients, and the reassurance of independent conﬁrma-
tion of prognosis would avoid many of the pitfalls of that
case.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have argued that one of the ethical
principles that should inﬂuence, and in the past has inﬂu-
enced transplantation policy is the need to maximize the
number and quality of organs for transplantation. There
is a substantial shortfall in organs for transplant. We
could overcome this in a range of ways. Future develop-
ments in xenotransplantation, stem cell-based therapies,
or neo-organs might make the use of organs from
deceased donors unnecessary. However, such solutions
are some time off, and in the meantime thousands of
patients per year die for want of a transplanted organ.
The most promising immediate source of organs for
transplantation is the large number of patients who die in
intensive care units in hospitals following diagnosis of
brain death, or decisions to withdraw LST on the basis of
poor prognosis, the group that we have referred to as
LSW donors. At present the majority of such organs are
buried or burned with the patient.
We have suggested a set of options for increasing the
number of organs that could be made available from
LSW donors. Simple measures should be adopted,
including improved efﬁciency of approaching families for
consent or a switch to an opt-out consent system;
however, they may not be enough to resolve the organ
shortfall. Organ Conscription would have the greatest
potential to increase the numbers of organs available for
transplantation, though it would come at the cost of
patient and family autonomy. If Organ Conscription is
not acceptable, the alternative that would have the great-
est potential in terms of organ numbers would be Organ
Donation Euthanasia. (Box 5)
93 As noted earlier (note 61), there is a relatively high level of commu-
nity support for the latter, though it has not been adopted in any
jurisdiction. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting
this objection.
94 Organ Donation Euthanasia would potentially be a Pareto improve-
ment in jurisdictions where voluntary active euthanasia is permitted and
a patient has consented to euthanasia (for reasons other than the dona-
tion of their organs), Coons & Levin, op. cit. note 59. However, again,
this does not in itself settle the question of whether voluntary active
euthanasia (for patients who are not dependent on life support) should
be permitted (ibid.).
95 See note 1.
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dead donor rules, and the injunction against physician
killing. Yet it would not (if appropriate safeguards were
provided) lead to the death of any patients who would
otherwise live. The justiﬁcation for this is not limited to
utilitarian considerations. It is a Pareto improvement on
current practice for withdrawal of LST and organ dona-
tion, and may be Pareto optimal. ODE would apply to
patients who are going to die – and soon. It is already
accepted that it is permissible to withdraw life support
from these patients. It would prevent those individuals
from suffering as a consequence of withdrawal of life
support. And it would save the lives of up to 9 other
individuals. Many potential LSW donors, even if they
would have wanted to donate their organs, and their
families consent, are currently unable to donate. Their
organs die with them.
The most acceptable way to introduce Organ-
Donation Euthanasia would be to make it available as
an option for prospective organ donors. It must be
noted, though, that if ODE were made available in this
way, it would have (at least in the short term) only a
small impact upon the organ shortfall since only a few
individuals would be likely to embrace it. This would
undermine to some degree the case in terms of organ
supply for ODE. But if we can save even one life, that is
something of great moral importance. Many lives could
be saved even if only a small percentage of people opted
for ODE. And there is also a strong autonomy-based
argument for allowing individuals who wish to donate
their organs to opt in to ODE (in the circumstance that
they are severely ill in intensive care and going to have
life support withdrawn.) We should allow people to
make advance directives indicating that they would like
to be eligible for this alternative. We should encourage
and support such altruistic desires.
To some degree at least, there is a conﬂict between the
needtosupplyorganstothelargestnumberofindividuals
able to beneﬁt from them, and our beliefs about how we
ought to care for those who are dying or dead. We have
outlinedsevenalternativesthatmayincreasethesupplyof
organs. These alternatives clash with one or more of the
traditionallyacceptedethicalprinciplesthatgoverntrans-
plantation, though they potentially promote other ethical
values including those of autonomy and beneﬁcence.
Whichever transplantation policy is adopted, we should
ensure that decisions about withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatmentareseparatedfromdecisionsaboutorgandona-
tion, and that organ donation procedures carry minimal
risks of causing suffering to organ donors. But continuing
current transplantation practice comes at a cost, in terms
of a signiﬁcant number of patients who die or continue to
suffer organ failure for want of an available organ. We
shouldthinkseriouslyaboutwhetheritistimetoembrace
an alternative strategy.
APPENDIX
Estimating the potential beneﬁt of alternatives
in terms of organ supply in the UK per year
In 2007/2008 in the UK there were 593 heart beating
(HB), i.e. brain dead. donors and 131 DCD donors.
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This corresponds to approximately 2312 organs available
for transplantation. There are 8000 patients on waiting
lists for organs (from a deceased donor), and approxi-
mately 450 patients die on waiting lists per year.
97
We have assumed that HB donors yield 3.9 organs per
donor, and DCD donors 2.7 organs per donor.
98 For
Options 2–7 we have assumed that consent rates are
similar to current levels in the UK. This assumption may
not be valid. See Section F.
96 UK Transplant, op. cit. note 16.
97 NHS Blood and Transplant, op. cit. note 7.
98 UK Potential Donor Audit, op. cit. note 22.
Box 5: Proposal for allowing Organ Donation
Euthanasia (ODE)
Deﬁnition: Removal of organs from a patient under
general anaesthesia.
Death follows removal of the heart.
Eligibility criteria:
1. The patient is dependent on life support in inten-
sive care
2. Withdrawal of life support is planned on the basis
of poor prognosis
3. Death is predicted to occur within a short period
after withdrawal of life support
4. Prognosis has been independently conﬁrmed
5. The patient has consented speciﬁcally for Organ
Donation Euthanasia
Arguments in favour of Organ Donation Euthanasia
1. It would promote patient autonomy
2. It would provide patients with the greatest chance
of being able to donate their organs after death
3. It would be a Pareto improvement over current
practice for treatment withdrawal and increase
the number and quality of organs available for
transplantation.
4. Suffering or discomfort for the patient would be
less likely than with withdrawal of life support
Arguments against Organ Donation Euthanasia
1. It may lead to a fall in organ donation rates due to
community non-acceptance
2. It could lead to the killing of patients who would
not otherwise have died
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would be needed to prevent the death of patients on
waiting lists. Additional organs would reduce the
waiting period for transplantation, and may also make
it possible for patients previously excluded from trans-
plantation to be offered organs. It is not clear how
many patients fall into this latter category, but the
number may be considerable.
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1. Not all patients who currently consent (or whose
families consent) to organ donation end up donating
their organs. This might be because their organs are
unsuitable for donation (for example if they do not
die quickly after withdrawal of LST, or if an unsus-
pected malignancy is found at the time of organ
donation). So the total number of donors with con-
scription = Total No. Potential donors * conversion
rate (for consenting patients)
2. In the UK potential donor audit, 2% of potential HB
donors (where the organ donor register was checked)
were listed on the register, but their family declined
consent for organ donation. 3% of potential DCD
donors were registered donors, but their family
declined consent. This would potentially translate
into a 2.3% increase in HB donors and a 4.5%
increase in DCD donors
100
3. The maximum beneﬁt for organ donation euthanasia
depends upon the number of eligible patients.
Current patients who are DCD donors would be able
to donate more organs (they would become HB
donors – this is the reason for the negative net
number of DCD donors). There would be additional
patients who currently are not eligible to donate by
DCD because they do not die soon enough after
withdrawal of LST. In the UK Potential Donor
Audit 93 potential DCD patients from whom
consent was obtained for organ donation did not end
up donating. Assuming that these patients fall into
this category of slower death, euthanasia prior to
organ donation would lead to an additional 93 (HB
equivalent) donors. However, this is likely to be an
underestimate.
101 Based upon Swiss data, 80% of
potentially eligible patients having withdrawal of
LST took more than 1 hour to die.
102 So an alterna-
tive estimate for the number of patients who could be
able to donate (following organ donation euthana-
sia) would be 5 times the current number of donors.
4. This would potentially lead to a similar number of
donors as organ donation euthanasia, though the
number/viability of organs would be similar to
current DCD donors (so the overall number of
organs would be less).
5. It is hard to quantify the number of organs that
might be available. The maximum number would be
close to the number available following organ dona-
tion euthanasia, however, the viability of organs may
be compromised.
6. This option may improve the viability of some organs
currently donated (e.g. kidneys), but would likely
yield less organs than Option 3. Here we have
assumed 1.7 organs per additional donor.
7. This is based upon an assumption that shorter
periods of asystole would allow donation of heart
and lungs (at a ratio similar to HB donors) from
DCD donors.
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